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Abstract
We experimentally evaluate the comparative performance of the winner-bid, average-
bid, and loser-bid auctions for the dissolution of a partnership. The recently introduced
empirical equilibrium analysis of Velez and Brown (2019b) reveals that as long as be-
havior satisfies weak payoff monotonicity, winner-bid and loser-bid auctions necessarily
exhibit a form of bias when empirical distributions of play approximate best responses.
We find support for both weak payoff monotonicity and the form of bias predicted by
the theory for these two auctions. Consistently with the theory, the average-bid auction
does not exhibit this form of bias. It has lower efficiency that the winner-bid auction,
however.
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1 Introduction
The average-bid auction (AB) is an intuitive mechanism for the dissolution of a partnership,
i.e., the allocation of an indivisible good among two agents when monetary compensation is
possible. Fair Outcomes Inc., a web service designed by some of the leaders in fair allocation
theory uses this protocol for their “fair buy-sell” service, which they describe as follows:
“The system provides each party with an opportunity to enter data into the
system under an escrow arrangement, including confidential data specifying a
monetary value for the property at which that party would be willing either to
sell its share to the other side or buy out the other side’s share (similar to the pro-
posal made by the initiating party under a traditional “buy-sell” arrangement).
The system compares the values entered by the parties and announces a sale to
the party that specified the higher value. However, the sale price is set at the
midpoint between the two values.” https://www.fairoutcomes.com/fb.html
(retrieved on May 3, 2019).
AB makes part of a family of mechanisms that can be described as follows. The arbitra-
tor asks agents to bid for the good. Then assigns the good to a higher bidder. This agent
pays to the other agent a convex combination of both bids with fixed weights multiplying
the winner and loser bids. AB determines the price with equal weights for both bids. Al-
ternative intuitive and practical price determination rules are to set the price as the winner
bid (WB auction), or the loser bid (LB auction).
Under independent symmetric private values, all mechanisms in this family have efficient
Bayesian Nash equilibria (Cramton et al., 1987). When information is complete they ob-
tain in Nash equilibria only efficient allocations that would result from a market with equal
incomes, i.e., they induce intuitively equitable outcomes (Velez and Brown, 2019a). Inter-
estingly, with complete information WB and LB essentially have the same Nash equilibrium
outcomes (Velez and Brown, 2019a).
The purpose of this paper is to experimentally evaluate the comparative performance
of LB, AB, and WB in a complete information environment. This is a relevant benchmark
for an arbitrator who oversees a divorce settlement or the dissolution of a long standing
partnership. Our main achievement is to document differences in agents’ behavior in these
mechanisms that are not predicted by Nash equilibrium, but are in line with the theoretical
results produced by the recently introduced empirical equilibrium analysis of Velez and
Brown (2019b,a) for these auctions. Our work constitutes the first experimental study that
tests the foundations of this theory and the comparative statics it predicts. Indeed, we
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organize our presentation around these two objectives.
Empirical equilibrium is the refinement of Nash equilibrium defined as follows. Imagine
that we construct a model that explains behavior in our experiments by means of some
structure of unobservables. For instance we can construct a QRE model of McKelvey and
Palfrey (1995). In general if we do not restrict the structure of unobservables in our model, it
may not be falsifiable. This actually happens with QRE (Haile et al., 2008). Thus, to make
our model falsifiable we discipline it with an a priori restriction on observables for which
there is empirical support. In simultaneous move games this is usually done by assuming
that behavior is weakly payoff monotone, i.e., by requiring that differences in behavior reveal
differences in expected utility (c.f., van Damme, 1991; McKelvey and Palfrey, 1996; Goeree
et al., 2005).1 We then require this property in all observables generated by our model
and identify the Nash equilibria that cannot be approached by it (a la Harsanyi, 1973).
If we had actually constructed the true model, it follows that behavior will never cluster
around these Nash equilibria. The problem is, of course, that we do not know what the
true model is. However, we know that if our a priori restriction on data does not make our
model misspecified, the complement of the closure of weakly payoff monotone behavior in
our game is always contained in the set of equilibria that is ruled implausible by the true
model. This leads us to the definition of empirical equilibrium as a Nash equilibrium that
is the limit of a sequence of weakly payoff monotone behavior. The Nash equilibria that
are not empirical are determined as implausible by any theory that is consistent with weak
payoff monotonicity. Thus, as long as weak payoff monotonicity is supported by data, if
behavior ends up being close to a Nash equilibrium, it has to be an empirical equilibrium.
The reality is that Nash equilibria are usually not observed in laboratory experiments.
Thus, empirical equilibrium per se is not the most appropriate theoretical benchmark to
analyze data from experiments. However, this refinement, because of its definition based
on proximity of empirically plausible behavior, produces two sets of predictions that are
plausible to be verified in experiments. First, if a Nash equilibrium is not empirical, it
is unlikely to be observed, even approximately. Second, if weak payoff monotonicity is
plausible and agents frequencies of play evolve towards mutual best responses, behavior will
eventually move towards an empirical equilibrium. For WB and LB this analysis produces
sharp comparative statics.
We assume that agents’ have quasi-linear preferences with values vl < vh, i.e., there
is a higher valuation (HV) and a lower valuation (LV) agent. Under this assumption, the
1An empirical distribution of play (for all agent types) is weakly payoff monotone if given two action
available to an agent, say a and b, if the agent plays a with higher probability than b, it must be the case
that the expected utility of a (given what the other agents are doing) is greater than the expected utility
of b
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winning bids in the Nash equilibria (including equilibria in mixed strategies) in both WB
and LB belong to the set {vl/2, ...., vh/2} (Velez and Brown, 2019a). All Nash equilibria of
WB and LB are essentially efficient.2 Thus, between the Nash equilibria associated with
two bids in the Nash range, the LV agent prefers the right one (being paid more) and the
HV agent prefers the left one (to pay less).
Empirical equilibrium reveals sharp differences between WB, AB, and LB (Velez and
Brown, 2019a). The empirical equilibria of WB have winning bids only on the left half of
the Nash range. The empirical equilibria of LB have winning bids only on the right half
of the Nash range. The exact bids that can be sustained in each case depend on the tie
breaker that is used in the auction and on the number of bids that are available outside the
Nash range. In our experiments we implement a deterministic tie breaker that favors the
HV agent. When there are enough bids outside the Nash range, the empirical equilibria
of WB are sustained by winning bids only on the left third of the Nash range, and the
empirical equilibria of LB are sustained by winning bids only on the right third of the Nash
range (Theorems 1 and 2).3 Thus, empirical equilibrium analysis predicts that if empirical
distributions of play in WB and LB are weakly payoff monotone, they will exhibit opposed
forms of bias when these distributions approach mutual best responses. WB favors the HV
agent and LB favors the LV agent. Moreover, this analysis produces comparative statics
for bid distributions both between LV and HV agents in the same auction, and for all types
between two different auctions. For AB, the whole range of assignments in the Nash range
are outcomes of empirical equilibria. Thus, this theory does not predict a necessary bias of
this mechanism.
The comparative statics predicted for payoffs and average bids by empirical equilibrium
analysis for WB and LB are supported by data (Sec. 4.1-4.2). WB is biased in favor of
the HV agents and LB is biased towards LV agents. AB is not necessarily biased in favor
of any of these populations. Even though effects like rounding induce violations of weak
payoff monotonicity in our data, there is support for a positive association of bids with
their expected utility (Sec. 4.3). We can conclude that the bias of WB and LB is likely to
be a structural invariant of these auctions. Thus, AB is indeed on a sweet spot that may
balance better the incentives of these auctions with respect to the equity that is obtained.
The ranking of auctions in terms of efficiency favors WB over the other two formats, and
2When the arbitrator breaks ties uniformly at random, there may be some Nash equilibria of WB and
LB in which the LV agent wins the good with positive probability. This probability goes to zero when the
number of bids in the Nash range is increases. With the tie breaker in our experiments all Nash equilibria
of WB and LB are efficient.
3Velez and Brown (2019a) provide a complete characterization of the empirical equilibria of WB and LB
for the symmetric tie breaker. The result is qualitatively the same as with the asymmetric tie breaker that
we use in our experiments (see Sec. 2.2).
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if anything favors AB over LB (Sec. 4.4). Thus, we document a tradeoff between efficiency
and equity of these mechanisms.
There is little experimental evidence on the comparative performance of WB, AB, and
LB. Kittsteiner et al. (2012) and Brown and Velez (2016) evaluate WB under incomplete
and complete information structures, respectively, and compare it with an alternative se-
quential mechanism in which one agent proposes a price and then the other decides either
to buy or sell at that price. Brown and Velez (2016) documented agents’ propensity to
underbid compared to their Nash equilibrium predictions in WB, which is replicated in our
experiments. This study also observed that this pattern of behavior is replicated by the
QRE models of McKelvey and Palfrey (1995). Following this lead Velez and Brown (2019b)
defined empirical equilibrium and Velez and Brown (2019a) characterized the whole set of
empirical equilibria of WB and LB. Our paper complements these two studies by provid-
ing experimental evidence supporting the foundations of this theory and the comparative
statics it produces.
As part of the empirical equilibrium agenda, our paper has similarities in spirit with the
literature that analyses mechanisms for populations of (as if) boundedly rational agents (c.f.,
Anderson et al., 1998, 2001; Eliaz, 2002; de Clippel, 2014; Masuda et al., 2014; de Clippel
et al., 2017; Kneeland, 2017) and implementation in equilibria resulting from convergence
processes (Cabrales and Serrano, 2012; Tumennasan, 2013). The closest among these papers
is Masuda et al. (2014), which shows how a certain mechanism for the provision of public
goods performs well both in experiments and in theory among populations of boundedly
rational agents who follow certain parametric deviations from utility maximization.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Sec. 2 introduces our partnership
dissolution model and develops our theoretical benchmark in detail. Sec. 3 presents our
experimental design. Sec. 4 presents our experimental results. Sec. 5 concludes and discusses
the alternative predictions of undominated equilibria and other refinements that discard all
weakly dominated behavior.
2 Model and theoretical benchmark
2.1 Partnership dissolution
There are two agents N ≡ {l, h} who symmetrically own an indivisible good and need to
allocate it to one of them. Monetary compensation is possible and no money is burned in
the allocation process. We refer to agents as i and −i whenever it is convenient. Agent i’s
utility from receiving the object and paying pi to the other agent is vi − pi; the agent’s
utility from receiving transfer pi and no object is pi. We assume agents are expected utility
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maximizers. For analytical convenience we will assume valuations are even positive numbers
and that there is a maximum valuation v. We also assume vl < vh and denote the profile of
valuations by v ≡ (vl, vh). The set of possible allocations is that in which an agent receives
the object and transfers an amount p ∈ B ≡ {0, 1, ..., p} with p ≥ v/2, to the other agent.
We consider the following family of arbitration protocols.
Definition 1. The α-auction (with tie-breaker γ) is the mechanism in which each agent
selects a bid in B. An agent with the highest bid receives the object. In case of a tie,
the HV agent receives the object with probability γ. The agent who receives the object
pays α(winner bid)+(1 − α)(loser bid) to the other agent. The winner-bid auction (WB)
corresponds to α = 1; the average-bid auction (AB) corresponds to α = 1/2; the loser-bid
auction (LB) corresponds to α = 0. We refer to WB and LB as the extreme-price auctions
and to all other as interior-price auctions.
In order to simplify the interface in experiments, we implemented in the laboratory the
tie-breaker γ = 1. Our theoretical benchmark for both the symmetric and asymmetric tie-
breakers produces the same comparative statics (see Sec. 2.2 for details). In the remainder
of the paper whenever we refer to an α-auction the default tie-breaker is γ = 1.
2.2 Theoretical benchmark
We assume that agents know each other’s valuations for the object. With this informational
structure each α-auction induces a complete information game. For WB, AB, and LB we
denote these games by WB(v), AB(v), and LB(v), respectively. A (mixed) strategy of
agent i, which we denote by σi ∈ ∆(B), is a probability distribution on the set of possible
bids. Agent i’s expected bid given strategy σi is Eσi(b). A profile of mixed strategies
σ ≡ (σl, σh) is a Nash equilibrium of the α-auction with valuations v if each agent’s strategy
places positive probability only on bids that maximize the agent’s expected utility given
the strategy of the other agent. Agent i’s payoff when distributions of play are σ is pii(σ),
where, for convenience, we drop the dependence of this amount on v.
In order to characterize the Nash equilibria of the α-auctions, it is useful to define
agent i’s net valuation as the amount ci ≡ vi/2. Note that the agent is indifferent between
receiving the object and transferring ci to the other agent, and receiving no object and
being transferred ci. This means that the agent would be indifferent between being the
winner or the loser in an α-auction when the transfer from the winner to the loser is ci.
We follow Tadenuma and Thomson (1995) and refer to the amount ES(v) ≡ ch − cl as the
equity surplus for v.
6
Proposition 1. (Velez and Brown, 2019a)
1. Let σ be a Nash equilibrium of an extreme-price auction with valuations v. Then,
there is p ∈ {cl, ..., ch} in the support of both σl and σh such that the support of σl
belongs to {0, ..., p} and the support of σh belongs to {p, ..., p}.
2. The set of Nash equilibrium payoffs of each extreme-price auction for valuations v is
{(pil, pih) : pil = cl + t, pih = ch + (ES(v) − t), t = 0, ..., ES(v)}.
Nash equilibria of the extreme-price auctions have a simple structure. In each equi-
librium the HV agent receives the object and transfers, with certainty, a given amount
in {cl, ..., ch}. That is, for each Nash equilibrium there is a unique payoff determinant
bid in {cl, ..., ch}; and for each bid in this set there is a Nash equilibrium with this payoff
determinant bid. Because of this one-to-one relation between equilibrium payoffs and payoff-
determinant bids, we refer to {cl, ..., ch} as the Nash range. Note that both extreme-price
auctions are equivalent in terms of the Nash equilibrium payoffs they generate.
Observe also that extreme-price auctions produce in Nash equilibria only allocations
that maximize aggregate utility (are efficient), which span the whole spectrum of the so
called envy-free set, i.e., the allocations at which no agent prefers the allotment of the other
(Foley, 1967). This set also corresponds to the allocations that can be sustained by prices as
competitive equilibrium outcomes in a market with equal incomes, an intuitively equitable
institution (see Brown and Velez, 2016, for an extended discussion). At each such allocation
agent l receives a transfer greater than or equal to cl and agent h receives the object and
transfers no more than ch. Thus, each of these allocations determines a division of ch − cl,
the equity surplus, between the agents: If transfer is p, agent l captures p− cl and agent h
captures ch − p. Thus, the agents have opposite preferences on the Nash range. Between
two equilibria, agent l prefers the right one and agent h the left one.
When α is interior, one can easily see that equal bids in the Nash range constitute a
strict Nash equilibrium of the α-auction, i.e., a profile of strategies in which each agent is
playing her unique best response to the strategy of the other agent. The next proposition,
whose straightforward proof we omit, follows.
Proposition 2. For each v the set of strict Nash equilibrium payoffs of each interior-price
auction contains those of the extreme price auctions.
Velez and Brown (2019b) propose to refine the set of Nash equilibria by means of ap-
proachability by behavior satisfying the following regularity property for which there is
empirical support in diverse strategic situations (see Goeree et al., 2016). We specialize the
definition for the particular games we study.
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Definition 2 (Velez and Brown, 2019b). Let σ ≡ (σl, σh) be a profile of mixed strategies
in an α-auction with valuations v. Then, σ is weakly payoff-monotone for v if for each
i ∈ {l, h} and each pair of bids {b, d} ⊆ B, σi(b) > σi(d) implies that the expected payoff of
bid b for agent i in the α-auction with valuations v given σ is greater than the corresponding
expected payoff of bid d.
Weak payoff monotonicity simply requires that differences in behavior reveal differences
in expected payoffs. This property is satisfied by the most popular models for the analysis
of experimental data, e.g., the control cost models of van Damme (1991), the monotone
structural QRE models of McKelvey and Palfrey (1995), the regular QRE models of Goeree
et al. (2005).
Velez and Brown (2019b) define an empirical equilibrium of a game to be one of its
Nash equilibria that can be approximated by weakly payoff monotone behavior. Under the
hypothesis that behavior is weakly payoff monotone and approximates a Nash equilibrium,
this behavior must approach an empirical equilibrium.
In our partnership dissolution environment, it is technically feasible to characterize the
set of empirical equilibria of EPAs (Velez and Brown, 2019a). Essentially, the empirical
equilibria of these auctions separates. When there are enough bids outside the Nash range,
the empirical equilibria of WB (with symmetric tie-breaker) are sustained by winning bids on
the left fifth of the Nash range. Symmetrically, the empirical equilibria of LB are sustained
by winning bids on the right fifth of the Nash range. Velez and Brown (2019a)’s analysis
can be reproduced for the asymmetric tie-breaker that we used in our experiments. The
result is preserved qualitatively. When there are enough bids outside the Nash range, the
empirical equilibria of WB (with asymmetric tie-breaker) are sustained by winning bids on
the left third of the Nash range. Symmetrically, the empirical equilibria of LB are sustained
by winning bids on the right third of the Nash range.
Even though agents behavior in simultaneous games may approximate Nash equilibria,
it is usually noisy. Thus, one can expect that the hypothesis that behavior conforms to an
empirical equilibrium will be easily rejected from data. Because of this, for the purpose
of generating meaningful comparative statics to test experimentally, one should look into
the comparative statics that convergence to an empirical equilibrium produce. That is, one
should look into the characteristics of behavior that must be observed when this behavior
reaches a “reasonable” proximity to the empirical equilibria of the game.
Theorem 1. Let σ be a Nash equilibrium of WB(v) and {σλ}λ∈N a sequence of weakly-
monotone distributions for WB(v) such that as λ→∞, σλ → σ. Let t(v) ≡ max{2ch/3−
cl, ES(v)/3} + 1. Then, there exists Λ ∈ N such that for each λ ≥ Λ,
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1. If vl ≥ vh/3, Eσλ
l
(b) < cl + 1;
2. cl − 1 < Eσλ
h
(b) < cl + t(v);
3. pil(σ
λ) < cl + t(v) and pih(σ
λ) > ch + (ES(v) − t(v));
4. If pil(σ) > cl, Eσλ
l
(b) < Eσλ
h
(b).
Theorem 2. Let σ be a Nash equilibrium of LB(v) and {σλ}λ∈N a sequence of weakly-
monotone distributions for LB(v) such that as λ → ∞, σλ → σ. Let t(v) ≡ max{2(p −
cl)/3 − ch, ES(v)/3} + 1. Then, there exists Λ ∈ N such that for each λ ≥ Λ,
1. If ch ≤ p− (p − cl)/3, Eσλ
h
(b) ≥ ch − 1;
2. ch − t(v) < Eσλ
l
(b) < ch + 1;
3. pih(σ
λ) < ch + t(v) and pil(σ
λ) > cl + (ES(v) − t(v)).
4. If pih(σ) < ch, Eσλ
h
(b) > Eσλ
l
(b).
Since the proofs of Theorems 1 and 2 follow from modifications of the main arguments
in Velez and Brown (2019a), we present them in an Online Appendix.
Theorems 1 and 2 allow us to conclude that we should expect the extreme-price auctions
to be biased in opposite forms when they are operated. Observe that
max{2ch/3− cl, ES(v)/3} =
{
2ch/3− cl if vl ≤ vh/2;
ES(v)/3 if vl ≥ vh/2.
When there is few bids to the left of the Nash range (i.e., vl ≤ vh/2), empirically plausible
behavior in WB can approximate only equilibria to the left of 2ch/3 in the Nash range. If
there is enough bids to the left of the Nash range (i.e., vl ≥ vh/2), the bias of WB becomes
much more pronounced: Empirically plausible behavior in WB that approximates a Nash
equilibrium eventually assigns the HV agent essentially at least two thirds of the equity
surplus. Symmetric statements hold for LB. (Figure 1).
Summarizing, if we suppose that behavior will be weakly payoff monotone when WB
and LB are operated, as empirical distributions move towards mutual best responses,4 these
auctions will eventually exhibit opposed forms of bias: WB will benefit the HV agent and
LB will benefit the LV agent.
Empirical equilibrium analysis predicts no bias for interior-price auctions in the following
sense: For each payoff in the Nash range, there is a sequence of empirically plausible behavior
that converges to an equilibrium with this payoff.
4One can think for instance, but not necessarily, of agents exhibiting less noisy best responses as they
understand better the strategic situations.
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Nash range
Empirically plausible behavior
in WB can approximate only
the left third of Nash range
Empirically plausible behavior
in LB can approximate only
the right third of Nash range
(b)
Figure 1: Bias of extreme-price auctions. Each Nash equilibrium of an extreme-price auction can be
characterized by its payoff-determinant bid in the Nash range, i.e., the set {cl, ..., ch} (Proposition 1). Agent
l prefers equilibria to the right of the Nash range and agent h prefers equilibria to the left of the Nash range.
Empirically plausible behavior in the extreme price auctions, i.e., behavior that can be fit by an rQRE,
cannot approximate all Nash equilibria. In WB only a left segment of the Nash range can be approximated
(Theorem 1). In LB only a right segment of the Nash range can be approximated (Theorem 2). The length
of these segments depends on the number of bids that are available to the left and right of the Nash range,
respectively. Two cases can be distinguished for each auction. For WB it depends whether cl ≤ ch/2. For
LB it depends whether ch ≥ (cl + p)/2.
Remark 1. Consider a valuation structure v and p ∈ {cl, ..., ch}. For each interior price
auction with valuations v, there is a Nash equilibrium, σ, such that pil(σ) = cl + (p − cl)
and pih(σ) = ch + (ch − p), and a sequence of interior weakly payoff monotone behavior of
v that converges to σ.
Proposition 2 states that each bid in the Nash range is the outcome of a strict Nash
equilibrium. Thus, to prove this remark, we only need to observe that a strict equilibrium
is itself a weak payoff monotone distribution. Thus, it is trivially approached a constant
sequence of weakly payoff monotone behavior. Now, the limit of a sequence of weakly
payoff monotone behavior is always the limit of a sequence interior weakly payoff monotone
distributions (Velez and Brown, 2019b).
Remark 1 vis a vis Theorems 1 and 2 provides a meaningful insight about the perfor-
mance of α-auctions: While empirical plausibility of behavior and better understanding of
the auction game forces WB and LB to be biased, no such conclusion can be made with any
interior-price auction. It is worth noting that Proposition 1 does not predict that interior-
price auctions will always achieve more balanced divisions of the equity surplus than the
extreme price auctions, however.
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Figure 2: % of efficient allocations in a symmetric Logistic QRE for WB, AB, and LB auctions (see Goeree
et al., 2016, for definitions). Valuations and bid range correspond to two environments implemented in our
experiments. In valuation structure 1A, B = {0, .., 160}, cl = 10, and ch = 30. In valuation structure 2A,
B = {0, .., 290}, cl = 100, and ch = 120.
Finally, it is also interesting to determine the implications of empirical plausibility of
equilibria for the efficiency of α-auctions. We know that all Nash equilibria of extreme-
price auctions are efficient (Proposition 1).5 Thus, one can expect that when extreme price
auctions are operated, as empirical distributions of behavior move toward best responses,
the auctions will approximate an efficient allocation. This is also possible for each interior
price auction (Proposition 2).
A quantitative exercise allows us to visualize a pattern in which this process may oc-
cur. Fig. 2 shows the percentage of efficient allocations in a symmetric Logistic QRE in
the WB, AB, and LB auctions, for two valuation structures. These models satisfy weak
payoff monotonicity. In each environment efficiency increases as λ, the model’s proxy for
agents’ understanding of the mechanism, increases. Interestingly, which auction maximizes
efficiency for a given λ depends on the structural parameters of the game, i.e., the position
of the Nash range within the set of possible bids.
One can conclude that it is an empirical question to determine what auction format
performs best in a given environment. It is reasonable to hypothesize that the mechanism
that is understood the best is the one that achieves higher efficiency.
3 Experimental design and procedures
We design an experiment in order to test the comparative statics predicted by Theorems 1
and 2 and to evaluate the general performance of α-auctions. We test three different mech-
5This conclusion is essentially unchanged for the symmetric tie-breaker (Velez and Brown, 2019a).
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anisms: WB, AB, and LB. We test each mechanism under several different valuation struc-
tures which vary by session. Importantly, each type of session-valuation is balanced equally
across all three treatments. So there are equal and equivalent numbers of sessions in each
of the three treatments.
3.1 Experimental design
The experiment implemented the environment and α-auction described in Sec. 2. The 3×1
design utilized parameter values of α = 0, 0.5, 1, to produce WB, AP, and LB respectively.
Subjects, randomly selected into groups of two, determined how to allocate two indivisible
items with possible transfer payments.6 In all possible allocations, each subject received
exactly one item. Subjects received points for acquiring an item, equal to their value of that
item (i.e., induced values) plus or minus any points they transferred to the other subject.
Subjects’ values of both items were common knowledge to both players.
Under the α-auction, subjects submitted their bids for the item. The subject with the
higher bid received the item, and the subject with the lower bid received a transfer equal to
a convex combination of both bids, determined by the α value associated with the auction.
That is, the transfer amount equaled α × [high bid] + (1 − α) × [low bid]. In the case of
equal bids, the item was assigned to the subject with the HV for item B.
After submitting a bid, each subject was allowed to submit a possible value for the other
player’s bid. The experimental software then displayed the outcome (i.e., who gets which
item, what amount is transferred for each player, each players’ earnings for that period)
that would occur with those two bids as well as a table that showed all possibilities that
could happen if the other player’s bid were below, equal to, or above the subject’s bid (see
Figure 3). After a subject viewed these possibilities, she could choose to confirm her bid,
or chose an alternate bid. If she chose an alternate bid, the process repeated. The process
ended when a subject confirmed her bid.
At the end of the game a feedback screen would describe both players actions under
the mechanism and provide information on each subject’s valuation and total points earned
that round. All information was revealed to subjects at the end of the game as feedback
with the intent to aide learning over the course of the session. At the end of each game,
subjects would be reassigned to a subject pair and a new break-up game would begin with
each subject drawing new valuations. This process would continue for 40 periods.
6Consistent with previous literature (i.e., Brown and Velez, 2016), we chose to have subjects bid over
two items to match the generalized theoretical environment more closely and reduce the possibility that
subjects are motivated by the non-monetary desire to “win” an item (e.g., Cooper and Fang, 2008; Roider
and Schmitz, 2012).
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Figure 3: The α-auction Interface. Winner’s Bid Auction (α = 1) treatment shown.
Both players had a constant and equal value on item A that remained the same through-
out the session. For any period, for each grouping of subjects, one subject was randomly
assigned the high value on item B, the other was assigned the low value on item B. Thus
a subject’s value on item B could change for any period. The pair of valuations on item B
generally remained constant. Either they changed once between period 20 and 21, halfway
through the session, or they did not change at all.
To avoid incentives associated with repeated play, subjects were randomly re-assigned
to each other at the beginning of each period. Subjects were instructed that they were to
be randomly rematched each period, and no identifying information (e.g., subject number)
was disclosed to a subject about her match in any round. Each period began with each
subject seeing the valuation structure for the period.
3.2 Experimental Procedures
Twelve sessions were held at the Economic Research Laboratory (ERL) in the Economics
Department at Texas A&M University during spring and summer 2016. Subjects were
recruited using ORSEE software (Greiner, 2015) and made their decisions on software pro-
grammed in the Z-tree language (Fischbacher, 2007). Subjects sat at computer terminals
with dividers to make sure their anonymity was preserved. Subjects were 246 Texas A&M
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Player
Value of
Item A
Value of
item B
Player 1 50 250
Player 2 50 290
Table 1: A sample valuation. In this valuation, one subject valued item A at 50 and item B at 250. As
in our theoretical environment, the other subject with whom she is paired had the same value for item A,
but valued item B at 290. Each player had an equal chance of receiving the high value on item B for any
period. Values were common knowledge to both players.
session
type
valuation
structure
periods
value of
item A
values of
item B
WB
subjects
AP
subjects
LB
subjects
1
1A 1–20 100 (120,160)
20 30 22
1B 21–40 100 (120,320)
2
2A 1–20 50 (250,290)
20 20 20
2B 21–40 50 (250,450)
3 3 1–40 50 (250,450) 20 20 20
4 4 1–40 50 (250,290) 20 14 18
Table 2: Valuation structures used in 12 experimental sessions. Four different session types were used over
the three auction mechanism treatments. The first two session types used two different valuation structures
in Periods 1–20 and 21–40 respectively. Session types 3 and 4 used on valuation structure for the entire
session. There are six total valuation structures. 246 total subjects participated in these 12 sessions.
undergraduates from a variety of majors.
Experimental sessions can be categorized under four valuation structures, each featuring
one session under the WB, LB and AP auctions. In valuation structure 1, item A was valued
at 100 by both players; item B had respective valuations of (120, 160) for the first twenty
periods and (120, 320) for the second twenty periods. In the remaining three structures
all agents valued item A at 50. In valuation structure 2, item B had respective valuations
of (250, 290) for the first twenty periods and (250, 450) for the second twenty periods. In
valuation structure 3, item B had respective valuations of (250, 450) for all forty periods.
In valuation structure 4, item B had respective valuations of (250, 290) for all forty periods.
Sessions consisted of between 14–30 subjects. See Table 2 for more detail.
Experiments lasted about two hours. To avoid issues with preferences that involve
complementarities across periods (see Azrieli et al., 2018; Brown and Healy, 2018), one
period was randomly selected at the end of each experiment to be paid. Subjects received
earnings from that round converted to cash at the rate of 1 point=$0.10 (or 1 point=$0.13
under valuation structure 1) plus a $5 show-up payment. Earnings ranged from $10.50 to
$44.00 with $25.87 average.
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4 Experimental results
4.1 Mechanism bias
The quintessential implication of our theoretical model in this environment is that WB
and LB—essentially equivalent in terms of Nash equilibrium predictions—have profoundly
different implications for the HV and LV bidder. In short, WB will only achieve equilibria
that are most favorable to the HV agent, and LB will only achieve equilibria that are most
favorable to the LV agent. This is effectively mechanism bias.
To make results comparable across all sessions and valuations we focus on standardized
payoffs. Specifically we calculate equity surpluses above maximin. Recall that any agent
can ensure a minimum payoff by making a specific bid. The payoff and bid do not vary by
auction mechanism. This is the maximin bid and the minimum payoff guaranteed is the
maximin payoff. Because HV and LV agents have different maximin bids, these values are
different for each bidder type.
p˜ii =
{
pii−vh/2
vh/2−vl/2
= pii−vh/2ES(v) if vi = vh,
pii−vl/2
vh/2−vl/2
= pii−vl/2ES(v) if vi = vl.
(1)
A general property of these standardized payoffs is that when an outcome is efficient the
HV and LV agents’ values will total to 1. That is, the equity surplus is fully shared between
both agents. If the outcome is inefficient, the value of payoffs will total to -1. Thus totaling
standardized payoff values and comparing to 1 reveals the proportion of efficient outcomes
achieved under the mechanism. (Totals above 0 indicate more than half the outcomes were
efficient).
As we will see in the results, generally if equity divisions are very favorable to one type
of agent in efficient outcomes, they will be unfavorable to the same agent in inefficient
outcomes. To see why, consider a HV agent that gets 95% of the equity surplus when
outcomes are efficient. This means the item is trading at only 5% over the LV maximin.
Should an inefficient outcome occurs, the HV agent receives no item (a payoff of 0) and
receives only 5% of the equity surplus as compensation. This is 0.95 equity surpluses worse
than their maximin.
Table 3 provides overall summary statistics of standardized payoffs (equity surpluses
above maximin payoff) by valuation-session level for our eight sessions (12 valuations total)
of WB and LB. (Recall that in the first two session-trios, subjects experienced twenty pe-
riods of two consecutive valuations, hence the A and B). Whether we look at the valuation
or session level, in all cases the party predicted by theory to have higher payoffs has higher
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HV bidder LV bidder
valuation
structure
WB AP LB WB AP LB
1A
(20 periods)
0.336
(0.881)
200
0.140
(0.651)
300
0.038
(0.481)
220
0.105
(0.933)
300
0.247
(0.835)
220
0.262
(0.847)
300
1B
(20 periods)
0.664
(0.465)
200
0.312
(0.483)
300
0.099
(0.268)
220
0.176
(0.175)
300
0.248
(0.414)
220
0.410
(0.763)
300
2A
(20 periods)
0.225
(1.665)
260
0.217
(1.384)
180
-0.112
(2.277)
180
0.091
(1.321)
260
-0.006
(1.043)
180
0.257
(2.259)
180
2B
(20 periods)
0.441
(0.553)
260
0.215
(0.335)
180
0.023
(0.464)
180
0.221
(0.311)
260
0.429
(0.513)
180
0.355
(0.793)
180
3
(40 periods)
0.432
(0.752)
400
0.215
(0.574)
400
0.022
(0.478)
400
0.203
(0.361)
400
0.330
(0.549)
400
0.348
(0.896)
400
4
(40 periods)
0.381
(1.440)
400
0.187
(2.065)
280
-0.171
(1.372)
360
-0.022
(0.933)
400
0.013
(1.718)
280
0.349
(1.675)
360
overall
0.406
(1.098)
1,720
0.215
(1.072)
1,640
-0.025
(1.079)
1,560
0.122
(0.789)
1,720
0.220
(0.950)
1,640
0.335
(1.302)
1,560
Table 3: Mean, standard deviation, and number of observations of standardized payoffs, by auction type,
session×valuation structure for HV and LV bidders.
payoffs. High-value bidders receive 0.225–0.664 surpluses above their maximin in WB com-
pared to -0.171–0.099 for the LV bidder. In contrast, HV bidders receive -0.022–0.221 equity
surpluses above their maximin compared to 0.262–0.410 for the LV bidder in LB. Simple
binary permutation tests—either considering the 8 or 12 possible binomial draws of the null
hypothesis depending on whether we think about this at the session or valuation level—
would find this result significant at the 1%-level. Of course, observing aggregate results
at the session level may be problematic if there is substantial within-session variation that
is ignored (see Fre´chette, 2012). For this reason, we also consider mechanism bias at the
subject level. Because our experiment randomized whether a subject was HV or LV each
period, we can provide within-subject evidence for mechanism bias. Non-parametric results
confirm our findings. Of the 164 subjects in either WB or LB, 134 (82%) achieved higher
payoffs as the higher (or lower) valuation bidder in the direction predicted by theory. A
binomial test shows the result is significant at the 1% level.
We use regression analysis to parametrically model payoffs across mechanisms. Table 4
provides regression analysis of standardized payoffs across auction mechanisms for all out-
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(1) (2) (3)
standardized earnings
(equity surpluses over maximin)
all outcomes efficient not efficient
WB -0.098** -0.249*** 0.253**
(0.038) (0.050) (0.103)
LB 0.115** 0.466*** -0.426***
(0.051) (0.067) (0.089)
HV bidder -0.005 0.168** -0.442***
(0.040) (0.065) (0.123)
WB × 0.289*** 0.497*** -0.506***
HV bidder (0.054) (0.081) (0.160)
LB× -0.354*** -0.932*** 0.852***
HV bidder (0.058) (0.101) (0.152)
Constant 0.220*** 0.416*** -0.279***
(0.030) (0.043) (0.064)
Observations 9,840 7,024 2,816
R-squared 0.017 0.110 0.075
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4: Regressions of standardized payoffs on auction and bidder type for all allocations, and effi-
cient/inefficient allocations. Standard errors are clustered at the subject level.
comes, and only efficient and inefficient outcomes. The overall results are similar to what
can be observed from session averages. In WB the HV bidder receives payoffs of 0.406
equity surpluses above her maximin (the sum of coefficients WB auction + HV bidder and
their interaction term), the LV agent receives 0.123 equity surpluses above her maximin (a
difference of 0.284, statistically different than 0, p < 0.01). In LB this relation is reversed.
As predicted by theory, the LV bidder receives 0.335 surpluses above maximin statistically
different than the HV bidder who receives -0.025 (p < 0.01). In AB the LV bidder receives
0.220 (the constant) and the HV bidder receives a roughly identical amount.
Restricting our attention to efficient outcomes is quite useful to discover the nature of
the mechanism bias. Over time we expect efficient outcomes to become more prevalent;
ultimately overall payoffs will converge to efficient payoffs if there is enough time and fre-
quencies approach mutual best responses (Proposition 1). The results emphasize our main
findings. In efficient outcomes in the WB, the HV agent receives 2/3 more of the equity
surplus than the LV agent. In LB the LV agent receives 0.764 more of the equity surplus
than the HV agent. Under AB the HV agent receives 0.168 more. All results are statistically
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different across the auctions (p < 0.01).
As expected, inefficient outcomes flip the advantage for the favored party. The HV agent
receives -0.945 less than the LV agent in WB. The LV agent receives 0.409 less than the HV
agent in LB. In AB the HV bidder receives 0.442 less than the LV bidder.
Figure 4 shows the time trends of standardized payoffs over the 40 periods of the ex-
periment. The LV agent receives higher payoffs in LB and lowest payoffs in WB. These
rankings are reversed for the HV agent. Payoffs for both agents in AB are in the middle of
the other two auctions. These effects persist, if not intensify over the course of each session.
Separating efficient and inefficient outcomes provides an even sharper separation of payoffs
across mechanisms for both agents. Conditional on an efficient allocation, the ranking based
on overall payoffs coincides with that based on overall payoffs (Figure 4 (left)). Conditional
on an inefficient allocation, the ranking is reversed (Figure 4 (right)). The efficiency loss is
mostly paid by the agent who is favored by each respective mechanism.
In short, we find substantial evidence for the mechanism bias in the direction consistent
with theory. The sole mitigator of this bias is the achievement of inefficient outcomes which
if bids are consistent would flip the bias. Because these inefficient outcomes are occur less
often than inefficient ones and decrease over time, they are not sufficient to negate the
implications of our main theoretical prediction.
4.2 Bids
Having identified the mechanism bias as predicted by Theorems 1 and 2, we now proceed
to unravel its causes. We first examine the direct cause of the bias that is also predicted by
these theorems: the differences in bid distributions between mechanisms. WB should have
the lowest bids and the LV auction the highest.
To make bids comparable across different valuation structures, we standardize them as
well. Here we do not need to standardize HV and LV agents bids differently. We define them
as equity surpluses above the LV maximin. Conveniently, the Nash range for deterministic
bids is [0, 1].
b˜i =
bi − vl/2
vh/2− vl/2
=
bi − vl/2
ES(v)
(2)
Table 5 provides valuation-level summary statistics for standardized bids and payoffs for
HV and LV bidders, respectively. The results confirm the comparative static predictions of
theory. In all six valuations, average bids are lowest in WB, next highest in AB, and highest
in LB. If we think of each of these valuation-pairs as independent observations, we note that
this is the most extreme of 46,656 (66) possible permutations supporting this hypothesis; a
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Figure 4: Average normalized payoffs per period within the experiments for LV agent in efficient outcomes
(left) and inefficient outcomes (right). In an efficient allocation the normalized payoffs add up to one. Thus,
the graph of the normalized payoff for the HV agent in an efficient allocation is the mirror image, of the LV
agent’s, with respect to the horizontal line of level 0.5. In an efficient allocation the normalized payoffs add
up to minus one. Thus, the graph of the normalized payoff for the HV agent in an inefficient allocation is
the mirror image, of the LV agent’s, with respect to the horizontal line of level -0.5.
permutation test finds this result statistically significant (p < 0.01).7
Again, this session-level analysis may be problematic if there is substantial within-session
variation that is ignored (see Fre´chette, 2012). We next examine bidding distributions
at the subject level. Unlike our previous analysis of mechanism bias, we are primarily
concerned with between-subject variation in different treatments, rather than within-subject
differences for HV and LV agents. Table 6 provides regression analysis. The results confirm
our suspicion. Bidders in WB bid 0.576–0.627 equity surpluses lower than those in AB who
bid 1.010–1.089 equity surpluses lower than those in LB (p < 0.01 for both comparisons).
These findings are consistent with the averages we note in Table 5.
Also of note is the comparative statics involving the variance of the bidding distributions.
Nash equilibria of extreme price auctions always involve an agent placing a deterministic bid:
the HV agent in WB and the LV agent in LB (Proposition 1). If weakly payoff-monotone
7Alternatively if we think of each session as independent, this is the most extreme of 1296 (64) observations
and still falls under the same level of significance (p < 0.01).
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HV bidder LV bidder
valuation
structure
WB AP LB WB AP LB
1A
(20 periods)
0.309
(0.568)
200
0.760
(0.797)
300
1.482
(1.312)
220
0.120
(0.743)
200
0.553
(0.748)
300
1.165
(1.031)
220
1B
(20 periods)
0.198
(0.145)
200
0.530
(0.258)
300
1.198
(0.500)
220
0.018
(0.094)
200
0.372
(0.222)
300
0.900
(0.294)
220
2A
(20 periods)
-0.520
(1.453)
260
0.152
(1.336)
180
2.020
(3.091)
180
-0.888
(1.515)
260
-0.023
(1.397)
180
1.766
(2.921)
180
2B
(20 periods)
0.292
(0.195)
260
0.787
(0.276)
180
1.316
(0.867)
180
-0.034
(0.383)
260
0.501
(0.229)
180
0.943
(0.550)
180
3
(40 periods)
0.154
(0.414)
400
0.671
(0.598)
400
1.547
(0.995)
400
-0.242
(0.387)
400
0.365
(0.445)
400
1.028
(0.575)
400
4
(40 periods)
-0.544
(1.198)
400
0.039
(2.210)
280
2.241
(2.445)
360
-0.867
(1.253)
400
-0.382
(2.133)
280
2.022
(2.192)
360
overall
-0.066
(0.936)
1,720
0.509
(1.153)
1,640
1.676
(1.798)
1,560
-0.381
(0.998)
1,720
0.245
(1.122)
1,640
1.334
(1.603)
1,560
Table 5: Mean, standard deviation, and number of observations of standardized bids, by auction type,
session×valuation structure for HV and LV agents.
behavior approximates one of these Nash equilibria, unless the equilibrium produces the
extreme outcome of the Nash range, the other agent uses a strictly mixed strategy (Theo-
rems 1 and 2). Thus, empirical analysis predicts that bidding variance should be greater
for the LV bidder in LB and variance should be greater for the HV bidder in WB.8 In 4 of
our 6 valuation-session combinations is the variance for the LV agent higher than the HV
agent in WB. In 6 of our 6 valuation-session combinations is the variance on the HV type
greater than the LV type. Permutation tests show this result is signifiant a the 10-% level.9
At the subject level, 72 of 132 subjects exhibit higher variance as a LV agent than as a HV
agent in WB. 71 subjects of 118 exhibit higher variance in the opposite direction in the LV
auction. The difference is statistically significant at the 5-% level.
We now are beginning to unravel the reasons behind mechanism bias. On average, bids
in WB are 1.5 equity surpluses lower than LB (note that this is consistent with empirical
8Our results do not make predictions for the AP auction, but interestingly, the measures of standard
deviation are very similar between HV and LV agents.
9If we collapse to session, in 3 of the 4 WB auctions is the variance higher for WB and 4 of the 4 sessions
is the variance higher for the LV auction. The value is significant at the 10-% level for a permutations test.
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(1) (2) (3)
standardized bids
(equity surpluses over LV maximin)
all outcomes efficient not efficient
WB -0.627*** -0.566*** -0.691***
(0.077) (0.087) (0.104)
LB 1.089*** 0.823*** 1.476***
(0.117) (0.084) (0.230)
HV bidder 0.264*** 0.714*** -0.876***
(0.037) (0.072) (0.104)
WB× 0.051 -0.039 0.028
HV bidder (0.055) (0.088) (0.164)
LB× 0.079 0.593*** -0.612**
HV bidder (0.091) (0.183) (0.252)
Constant 0.245*** 0.059 0.717***
(0.056) (0.067) (0.066)
Observations 9,840 7,024 2,816
R-squared 0.241 0.357 0.317
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 6: Regressions of standardized payoffs on auction and bidder type for all allocations, and effi-
cient/inefficient allocations. Standard errors are clustered at the subject level.
equilibrium predictions, for at least an agent plays a mixed strategy in equilibria that
sustain interior outcomes in the Nash range). These bids are associated with more than a
full equity surplus capture for the favored party. If we focus only on deterministic bids, in
outcomes that are ultimately efficient (regression (2)), the deterministic bid in WB is 0.168,
the deterministic bid in LB is 0.882 (these numbers are statistically different, p < 0.001).
This would correspond with roughly 80% of the surplus captured by the favored party in
each auction (note that this is consistent with Theorems 1 and 2).
In stark contrast is AB. Both predicted LV and HV bids fall within the Nash range
of bids (between 0 and 1). This necessarily means the transfer between parties will be in
the Nash range. The average value of the two predicted bids is 0.386, which is statistically
different than 0.5 (p < 0.01), an equal split of the surplus, but not particularly far from it.
(Recall from Table 3 that the HV bidder earns roughly 17% more (p < 0.05) of the surplus
than the LV bidder in efficient allocations in AB).
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4.3 Weak payoff monotonicity
The distribution of bids provide an explanation as to how the mechanism bias within ex-
treme common value auctions will occur. What we have not explained is why such bid
distributions occur. Our theoretical benchmark shows that if empirical distributions are
weakly payoff monotone they need to exhibit these patterns if they approach a Nash equi-
librium. We now examine whether empirically observed patterns are consistent with weak
payoff monotonicity.
A first observation is that the size of our data set is not enough to make full hypothesis
testing on weak payoff-monotonicity. In our environment with hundreds of actions no
realistic data set can test this property. With 451 bidding actions, monotonicity makes
directional predictions for 101,926, (n + 1)n/2 binary relations. Moreover, in order to
estimate the expected payoff of an action one needs estimates of the whole distribution
of play. Thus, one cannot simply reduce the scope of the analysis to some key binary
comparisons. Because of this we concentrate on determining whether there is a positive
association between empirical expected payoffs and the probability with which agents choose
their actions, a feasible task.
As a first approach, which allows us to graphically asses the monotonicity properties
of empirical distributions, we calculate the empirical expected payoffs of each bid for both
LV and HV agents in each period within each valuation-session. For every period, in each
experimental session, we calculate the expected payoffs of making a particular bid as a
HV (or LV) against the known distribution of subject bids of other LV (or HV subjects).
(Because the experiment featured randommatching, there was a 1/(N/2) chance any subject
would encounter the other N/2 subjects of the opposite type. Thus a period’s distribution
are the ex-ante payoffs a subject would encounter before being matched to a specific player.)
We calculate these distributions for each type player, for every bid choice, for every period
in our 12 experimental sessions.10
Following our work in Velez and Brown (2019c), we perform a simple test of a basic
property of weak monotonicity: strategies played should have higher payoffs than those
that are not played. We focus on the 12 separate sessions or 18 separate valuation-sessions
as our level of observation. In both cases all observations have higher average payoffs for
strategies played than not played. A sign test rejects the hypothesis that it the difference
between these two groups has zero median (p < 0.001). Indeed, Velez and Brown (2019c)
find a similar result across a wide variety of dominant strategy games.
10For our purposes, there are not meaningful differences with any of the following analysis if we take the
entire valuation-session distribution and ignore period distinctions. In general results look less noisy and
provide added emphasis to our main results.
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Figure 5: Aggregate frequency of bids in corresponding ventiles of normalized empirical expected payoffs
for (a. top) LV agent (b, bottom) HV agent.
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(1) (2) (3)
bid was selected
expected payoff 0.042*** 0.028*** 0.037***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
WB × 0.002***
expected payoff (0.003)
LB × -0.013***
expected payoff (0.003)
HV bidder× -0.003***
expected payoff (0.002)
period× 0.001*** 0.001***
expected payoff (0.000) (0.000)
bid is divisible 1.752***
by 5 (0.090)
bid is divisible 0.763***
by 10 (0.074)
bid is divisible 1.112***
by 50 (0.080)
valuation dummies N N Y
subject clusters 246 246 246
observations 3,301,358 3,301,358 3,301,358
pseudo r-squared 0.140 0.142 0.312
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 7: Conditional logit regression of bid number on current period expected payoff. Specification 2 adds
interaction with period. Specification 3 adds interaction with period, auction type, and bidder type as well
as dummy variables for round numbers and valuation.
To further illustrate the extent subject play is tied to future payoffs, we rank each
possible bid by its expected payoff in each period and sort them into ventiles. Figure 5
shows a historgram of the expected payoff ventile for the bids chosen by subjects in each
of the auction mechanisms. For instance in WB, the HV agent chose a bid associated with
the top 5% of current period expected payoffs in roughly 45% of all choices. The result is
quite astounding; subjects play remarkably well against a future distribution of payoffs.
The standard parametric empirical framework to examine the correlation between ex-
pected payoffs and decisions is a conditional logistic regression. We follow that framework
here. Specifically, we examine over the range of all possible bids whether individuals play
higher expected-payoff bids with higher probability. That is,
logit (Pr (bijt = 1|Et (pi(j)))) = β1 × Et (pi(j)) + β2 × xit. (3)
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where bijt is a binary variable denoting whether subject i chose bid j in period t. Here,
Et (pi(j)) represents the expected payoff (knowing the decision of the other N/2 subjects in
period t will be selected uniformly at random, see above) of bid choice j in period t. Payoff
units are in experimental currency units.11
Table 7 provides the results of this regression specification. It is clear that the probability
of a strategy played is positively correlated with its expected value in the current period.
Average marginal effects (not shown), suggest a gain in expectation of 100 experimental
points increases the likelihood of that bid being chosen by a subject by 15 probability
points (from specification 1). Payoff responsiveness of subjects increases over time (see
period interaction variable in specifications (2) and (3)), though the marginal effects of
those specifications suggest these results do not have economic significance. This effect is
robust to controlling for session type, experience, and whether the bid is a round number,
all of which are also predictive of play.
Our theoretical model relied on the assumption of monotonicity to show in this environ-
ment only certain equilibria would be possible under certain mechanisms. Our analysis to
this point has coincided with the theory in lockstep. First, subjects obey a loose definition
of monotonicity, as they play strategies associated with a expected higher payoff more often.
Second, bids tend to be near the low end of the Nash distribution in WB, the high end of
the Nash distribution in LB and the middle range of the distribution in AB. This directly
means that in efficient outcomes a bias is present; WB, than AB, than LB are best for
the party with the HV on the item. Because efficient outcomes occur more often than not
(shown next section) this translates to overall mechanism advantages following the same
order.
4.4 Efficient and equal-income competitive equilibrium outcomes
The purpose of the auctions mechanisms in this paper is to achieve efficient outcomes for
both players with transfers that fall under prices that could conceivably observed in a market
with equal incomes. To that end, it is important to examine how often these mechanism
worked as intended. That is, how often the bidder with the high value on item B received
that item, and how often this was accompanied by a transfer that is associated with an
equilibrium outcome. Note that these outcomes occur at the subject-pair level, as in every
period of this experiment, two subjects observed the exact same outcome.
As before we first observe session averages. Table 8 provides valuation-session averages
11Recall, that one of forty periods was selected at random and converted to cash at 1 point = $0.10 (The
first valuation structure used 1 point = $0.13). So a single point has expected value of roughly 0.25 of a
cent.
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efficient outcomes equilibrium outcomes
valuation
structure
WB AP LB WB AP LB
1A
(20 periods)
0.720
(0.450)
200
0.693
(0.462)
300
0.650
(0.478)
220
0.690
(0.464)
200
0.630
(0.484)
300
0.518
(0.501)
220
1B
(20 periods)
0.920
(0.272)
200
0.780
(0.415)
300
0.755
(0.431)
220
0.915
(0.280)
200
0.770
(0.422)
300
0.709
(0.455)
220
2A
(20 periods)
0.658
(0.475)
260
0.606
(0.490)
180
0.572
(0.496)
180
0.446
(0.498)
260
0.428
(0.496)
180
0.250
(0.434)
180
2B
(20 periods)
0.831
(0.376)
260
0.822
(0.383)
180
0.689
(0.464)
180
0.827
(0.379)
260
0.806
(0.397)
180
0.633
(0.483)
180
3
(40 periods)
0.818
(0.387)
400
0.772
(0.420)
400
0.685
(0.465)
400
0.745
(0.436)
400
0.680
(0.467)
400
0.490
(0.501)
400
4
(40 periods)
0.680
(0.467)
400
0.600
(0.491)
280
0.589
(0.493)
360
0.367
(0.483)
400
0.243
(0.430)
280
0.258
(0.438)
360
overall
0.764
(0.425)
1,720
0.717
(0.451)
1,640
0.655
(0.475)
1,560
0.638
(0.481)
1,720
0.599
(0.490)
1,640
0.460
(0.499)
1,560
Table 8: Mean, standard deviation, and number of observations of standardized bids, by auction type,
session×valuation structure for HV and LV agents.
of efficient and equilibrium outcomes in each of the twelve experimental sessions. For each
measure, in each session-valuation pair, WB achieves the highest percentage of desired
outcomes, then AP, then LB. Admittedly, this relationship was not hypothesized by any
theory. However, even if we allow an additional degree of freedom because we may not
necessarily expect this relationship, permutation tests would find the ordering significant at
the 1-% level.12 Table 9 shows the results of a regression using additional controls, jointly
clustered on subject and type (who is HV and LV) and achieves nearly identical results.
It is important to think about the implications of this result, even though it was not
necessarily predicted by theory ex-ante. On the one hand, our quantitative exercise in Sec. 2
revealed that the relative performance of these auctions can be affected by the details of
the environment. On the other hand, for the particular model for which the quantification
was done, moving towards best responses increases the efficiency of the all mechanisms in
the different environments in which calculations were done. In view of this computational
12If we think of each session as independent and do not count the first session, the next three sessions are
the most extreme of 216 (63) observations (p < 0.01) to reject the hypothesis.
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efficient outcome equilibrium outcome
WB 0.061** 0.082***
(0.024) (0.031)
LB -0.054* -0.114***
(0.029) (0.035)
Period within valuation 0.004*** 0.007***
(0.001) (0.001)
120-320 valuation 0.145*** 0.352***
(0.026) (0.031)
250-450 valuation 0.095*** 0.337***
(0.029) (0.034)
250-290 valuation 0.219*** 0.516***
(0.032) (0.036)
Constant 0.549*** 0.211***
(0.026) (0.036)
Observations 4,920 4,920
R-squared 0.044 0.175
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 9: Regressions of efficient and equilibrium outcomes on auction, valuation, and period within valua-
tion. Standard errors are 2-way clustered on each subject×bidder-type pair.
benchmark, the result is not particularly surprising. WB is a mechanism unlike the other
two. It is plausible that subjects entering a laboratory experiment would already have some
experience with the first-price auction, a related popular auction format.
5 Discussion and concluding remarks
We have shown experimental evidence supporting that WB and LB are biased mechanisms
and that AB balances better the interests of both agents in complete information partner-
ship dissolution environments. WB benefits the HV agent and LB benefits the LV agent.
AB has lower efficiency than WB in our experiments, however. The efficiency ranking seems
to be connected with the degree to which agents understand the mechanisms. Thus, one
can conclude that an arbitrator who selects a mechanism between these three is unambigu-
ously better off by not using LB. It would be interesting to see if the performance of AB
can increase with alternative ways in which this mechanism is framed and explained to
individuals. In this case a social planner may not have to choose between efficiency and
equity when selecting a mechanism to dissolve a partnership.
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Figure 6: Distribution of bids WB session type 1B. The Nash range for this valuation structure is
{10, ..., 110}. All bids of the LV agent and 98% of the HV agent fall in the range shown in the figure.
We conclude with a discussion of alternative refinements of Nash equilibrium for the
WB and LB games.
A substantial literature in game theory has studied the plausibility of equilibria (see
van Damme, 1991, for an early survey). In general, the refinements proposed in these
studies are founded on decision theoretical arguments that implicitly or explicitly assume
“admissibility,” i.e., weakly dominated behavior is not plausible.
In our environment, any refinement satisfying admissibility selects a single equilibrium
outcome for each of WB and LB. The HV agent selects a standardized bid of 0 in WB and
the LV agent selects a standardized bid of 1 in LB (these are the payoff determinant bids).
Clearly, these equilibrium refinements also predict the direction of mechanism bias revealed
by empirical equilibrium analysis.
In general, refinements satisfying admissibility are not consistently good predictors at
selecting an equilibrium from empirical data. A variety of experiments with dominant strat-
egy mechanisms, with a unique dominant strategy equilibrium, have shown the prevalence
of weakly dominated behavior in these games (see Velez and Brown, 2019c, for a meta-study
of these papers). Moreover, Goeree et al. (2016) note several instances where logit QRE
converges to a dominated equilibrium. In all these cases, logit QRE is the better predic-
tor compared, for instance, with trembling-hand-perfect equilibrium. (Recall that Logistic
QRE satisfy weak payoff monotonicity).
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Weakly dominated actions may be compelling in an extreme-price auction (see Sec. 6.4
Velez and Brown, 2019b, for a related discussion). Consider for instance our valuation
structure 1B, in which the Nash range is {10, ..., 110}. Let bl > 10. One can easily see that
bl is weakly dominated by 10 for the LV agent in WB. Utility maximization predicts that
the LV agent bids bl only if agent h never bids to the left of bl. Thus, it is tempting to think
that the LV agent, considering a small deviation by the HV agent will always preemptively
bid 10 instead. If the LV agent follows this safe choice consistently, the incentive of the HV
agent is to bid also 10, leaving the LV agent with the lowest possible share of the equity
surplus.
One can argue that bidding bl above 10 is normatively compelling and intuitively plau-
sible, however. This is the only way that the LV agent can enforce a more balanced division
of the equity surplus. Thus the risk that the LV agent takes when bidding 10 is the means
to enforce a better equilibrium. Moreover, when bl is still close to 10, the LV agent is prac-
tically bearing no risk, for this agent would lose very little when the HV agent bids below
bl. If bl satisfies the conditions of our Theorem 1, the LV agent can bid bl with enough
probability to keep in check the incentives of the HV agent and still satisfy weak payoff
monotonicity. The HV agent on the other hand, would lose much more than the LV agent
in case this last agent ends up getting the object and paying bl for it. Thus, the probability
that the HV agent bids below 10 should also be very small if the LV agent is consistently
biding at least bl with (enough) positive probability. Thus, not only the LV agent may not
care much about the risk of buying for bl, but also if the HV agent is taking notice of this
behavior, the probability that this happens is also very small, reinforcing the incentive of
the LV agent to bid bl. Thus, one can make the case that it is plausible to observe bids
accumulating in the interior of the Nash range. Data from our experiment for WB with
this valuation structure seems in line with the intuition that we just described (Fig. 6).13
Thus, imagine that an arbitrator operates WB in a society in which agents’ valuations are
correlated with a characteristic that is protected by law against statistical discrimination.
For instance suppose that the population can be partitioned in two sets, H and L, and that
on average agents in H hold higher valuations than agents in L. Suppose that L preset a
class action suit against the arbitrator and argue, based on a theoretical benchmark and
experimental data corroborating it, that this mechanism is systematically biased against
them (field data with observable valuations is likely to be unfeasible). If the theoretical
benchmark is Nash equilibrium, the argument is easily dismissed based on the multiplicity
of equilibria that do not exhibit the bias. If the theoretical benchmark is trembling-hand-
13This was the maximal efficiency session in our experiment (92%)). This means that this is the session in
which bid distributions of LV and HV agents separated the most. This makes this session our best example
to illustrate this phenomenon.
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perfection or other equilibrium refinement that dismisses all weakly dominated behavior,
the argument is easily dismissed based on the long history of experiments in which weakly
dominated behavior is persistently observed. For instance, our Fig. 6 would be a good
Exhibit A. A spin doctor would argue that since LV agents in this session-valuation (or any
of the aforementioned experiments) are able to hold their ground against HV agents and
keep them from bidding below 20 units, it is plausible that they can do so for any amount
in the Nash range. By contrast, an argument based on empirical equilibrium analysis is
not easily dismissed. Indeed, to do so one needs to dismiss the tendency of agents to
select actions that give them higher payoffs. If this property is satisfied in data, empirical
distributions of WB will look like Fig. 6 as bids become separated and efficiency is achieved.
It is possible that LV holds their ground and bid more than 10, say bl. There is a limit,
however. If the agents’ actions are informed by expected utility, as bl increases, there is
more and more actions that are better than bl for LV . If these actions are played with
sufficient probability, comparatively speaking with respect to the probability with which
LV plays bl, then this bid cannot be too far from 10. This is indeed the intuition captured
by empirical equilibrium, which is confirmed in our data.
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Appendix not for publication
We denote the strategy that selects bid b for sure by δb. The expected payoff of agent i
from bidding b in the α-auction when the other agent plays strategy σ−i is Uα(δb|σ−i; vi).
Proof of Theorem 1. Let σ, {σλ}, and t(v) be as in the statement of the lemma. By
Proposition 1 there is p ∈ {cl, ..., ch} in the support of σl and σh such that the support of
σl belongs to {0, ..., p} and the support of σh belongs to {0, ..., p}. If p = cl, statements 1-3
follow from convergence of σλ, i.e., because as λ→∞, σλ → σ; statement 4 holds because
pil(σ) = cl. Suppose that p = cl + 1. Then, ES(v) ≥ 1, and t(v) > 1. Statement 2 follows
from convergence of σλ. Statement 3 follows from convergence given that pil(σ) = cl + 1
and pih(σ) = ch + (ES(v) − 1). Recall that vh > vl ≥ 0. If vl ≥ vh/3, then vl > 0. Then,
U1(δcl−1|σ
λ
h; vl)− U1(δp|σ
λ
h ; vl) =
∑
r<cl−1
σλh(r)2 + σ
λ
h(cl)(1) > 0,
and
U1(δcl |σ
λ
h ; vl)− U1(δp|σ
λ
h ; vl) =
∑
r<cl
σλh(r) + σ
λ
h(cl)(1) > 0.
By monotonicity, σλl (cl− 1) ≥ σ
λ
l (p) and σ
λ
l (cl) ≥ σ
λ
l (p). By convergence, σl(cl− 1) ≥ σl(p)
and σl(cl) ≥ σl(p). Since the support of σl belongs to {0, ..., p}, then Eσl(b) ≤ cl. Statement
1 follows from convergence of σλ. Since Eσh(b) = cl+1, statement 4 follows from convergence
of σλ.
Suppose that τ ≡ p − cl > 1. Let y ≡ max{0, cl − (3τ − 1)}. An argument as in the
proof of Theorem 1 in Velez and Brown (2019a) shows that there is Λ ∈ N such that for
each λ ≥ Λ and each y ≤ b ≤ p,
σλl (b) ≥ σ
λ
l (p). (4)
Thus,
σl(p) ≤ 1/min{4τ, τ + cl + 1}. (5)
We claim that p ≤ cl + t(v) − 1. Suppose by contradiction that p − cl > max{2ch/3 −
cl, ES(v)/3}. Since σ is a Nash equilibrium, U1(δp|σl; vh) ≥ U1(δp−1|σl; vh). Thus,
vh − p ≥ (1− σl(p))(vh − p+ 1) + σl(p)(p).
Equivalently,
σl(p) ≥ 1/(2(ch − cl)− 2τ + 1). (6)
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By (5) and (6),
2(ch − cl)− 2t+ 1 ≥ min{4τ, τ + cl + 1}.
Suppose that min{4τ, τ + cl + 1} = 4τ . Then,
(ch − cl)/3 + 1/6 = ES(v)/3 + 1/6 ≥ τ = p− cl.
Since ch − cl and p− cl are integers, (ch − cl)/3 = ES(v) ≥ p− cl. This is a contradiction.
Suppose then that min{4τ, τ + cl + 1} = τ + cl + 1. Then,
2ch/3− cl ≥ τ = p− cl.
This is a contradiction.
Since Eσh(b) = p < cl+t(v)−1/2, pil(σ) = cl+p, and pih(σ) = ch+(ES(v)−p), statements
2 and 3 follow from convergence of σλ. Since the support of σl belongs to {0, ..., p}, by (4),
Eσl(b) ≤ (p+ cl)/2 < p = Eσh(b). Then, statement 4 follows from convergence of σ
λ.
Finally, suppose that vl ≥ vh/3. We claim that cl − (p − cl) ≥ 0. Consider first the
case that vl ≤ vh/2. Then, cl ≤ ch/2 and consequently (ch − cl)/3 ≤ 2ch/3 − cl. That is,
max{2ch − cl, ES(v)/3} = 2ch/3 − cl. Thus, p ≤ 2ch/3. Since cl ≥ ch/3, p − cl ≤ cl. If
vl > vh/2, max{2ch − cl, ES(v)/3} = ES(v)/3. Thus, p − cl ≤ ES(v)/3 = (ch − cl)/3 ≤
ch/6 < cl. An argument as that in the proof of Theorem 1 in Velez and Brown (2019a),
shows that for each q > cl such that cl − (q − cl) > 0, σ
λ
l (cl − (q − cl)) > σ
λ
l (q). Thus,
Eσl(b) < cl. Thus statement 1 follows from convergence of σ
λ.
We earlier claimed that an argument as in the proof of Theorem 1 in Velez and Brown
(2019a) shows that for each λ ∈ N and each cl < q such that cl − (q − cl) ≥ 0,
σλl (cl − (q − cl)) > σ
λ
l (q),
and that there is Λ ∈ N such that for each λ ≥ Λ, and each y ≤ b ≤ p, σλl (b) ≥ σ
λ
l (p). We
present now an explicit argument.
For i ∈ N and {b, d} ⊆ {0, 1, ..., p}, let ∆i(b, d) be the difference in expected utility for
agent i in WB between the two situations in which agent i bids strictly to the left of b and
bids exactly d, conditional on agent −i bidding b. Using this notation we have that when
b < d,
U1(δb|σ
λ
h, vl)− U1(δd|σ
λ
h , vl) =
∑
r<b σ
λ
h(r)(d − b) + σ
λ
h(b)(b − (2cl − d))
+
∑
b<r≤d σ
λ
h(r)∆l(r, d).
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Let cl < q ≤ p, ρ = q − cl, and cl − ρ ≤ b < q,
U1(δb|σ
λ
h , vl)− U1(δq|σ
λ
h , vl) =
∑
r<b σ
λ
h(r)(q − b) + σ
λ
h(b)(b − (2cl − q))
+
∑
b<r≤q σ
λ
h(r)∆l(r, q).
Now, b− (2cl− q) = b−2cl+(cl+ρ) = b+(cl−ρ) ≥ 0, ∆l(q, q) = 0, and for each b < r < q,
∆l(r, q) = ρ− (cl − r) > 0. Thus,
U1(δb|σ
λ
h , vl)− U1(δq|σ
λ
h , vl) > 0.
By monotonicity
σλl (b) > σ
λ
l (q).
This proves that for each cl < q such that cl − (q − cl) ≥ 0,
σλl (cl − (q − cl)) > σ
λ
l (q),
and that for each cl − τ ≤ b ≤ p,
σλl (b) > σ
λ
l (p). (7)
We complete the proof by induction on b. Let y < b ≤ ch − τ . Suppose that there is Λ ∈ N
such that for each λ ≥ Λ and for each b ≤ r ≤ p, σλl (r) ≥ σ
λ
l (p). We prove that Λ can be
selected large enough so for each λ ≥ Λ and for each b − 1 ≤ r ≤ p, σλl (r) ≥ σ
λ
l (p). By
convergence, for each b ≤ r ≤ p,
σl(b) ≥ σl(p). (8)
Let b ≤ s < p. Then,
U1(δs|σl, vh)− U1(δs−1|σl, vh) =
∑
r≤s−1 σ(r)(−1) + σl(s)(vh − s− s)
=
∑
r≥s σl(r)− 1 + σl(s)2(ch − s).
By (8) and since ch − s > ch − p = ch − (cl + τ),
U1(δs|σl, vh)− U1(δs−1|σl, vh) > 2σl(p)− 1 + σl(p)2(ch − cl − τ).
By (6), σl(p) ≥ 1/(2(ch − cl)− 2τ + 1). Thus,
U1(δs|σl, vh)− U1(δs−1|σl, vh) >
2(ch−cl−τ)+2
2(ch−cl)−2τ+1
− 1 > 0.
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Since σλ → σ, there is Λ ∈ N such that for each λ ≥ Λ,
U1(δs|σ
λ
l , vh)− U1(δs−1|σ
λ
l , vh) > 0.
By monotonicity, for each b ≤ s < p,
σλh(s− 1) ≤ σ
λ
h(s). (9)
Now,
U1(δb−1|σ
λ
h , vl)− U1(δp|σ
λ
h , vl) =
∑
r<b−1 σ
λ
h(r)(p − b+ 1)
+σλh(b− 1)(b− 1− (2cl − p))
+
∑
b−1<r≤p σ
λ
h(r)∆l(r, p)
> σλh(b− 1)(b − 1− (2cl − p))
+
∑
b−1<r≤p σ
λ
h(r)∆l(r, p)
=
∑
b−1≤r≤p σ
λ
h(r)∆l(r, p).
Since for each r < p, ∆l(r, p) = τ − (cl − r),
U1(δb−1|σ
λ
h, vl)− U1(δp|σ
λ
h , vl) >
∑
1≤x≤cl−τ−b+1
(σλl (cl − τ + x)
−σλl (cl − τ − x))∆l(cl − τ + x)
+
∑
cl−τ+(cl−τ−b+1)<r≤p
σλh(r)∆l(r, p)
≥ 0,
where the last inequality follows from (9). By monotonicity, σλl (b− 1) ≥ σ
λ
l (p).
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